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Abstract 
The ‘pink tide’ in Latin America, or what remains of it, is drawing 
increasing criticisms from the political left for its inability to confront 
existing socio-structural inequalities. This article contributes to these 
debates in two ways. First, as a means of understanding better the 
development strategies that have been followed by left-leaning 
governments, it highlights and critiques what it labels Elite Development 
Theory (EDT) encompassing Washington Consensus and Statist Political 
Economy. It shows how despite its self-stated objectives - the amelioration 
of the conditions of the poor and their uplifting - EDT is grounded in elite 
assumptions about social change: States and corporations are posited as 
prime-movers in the development process while collective efforts of 
labouring classes to pursue their own developmental strategies are ignored 
and/or de-legitimated. Exploitation, oppression and the ideological 
delegitimation of labouring class collective actions form the core of EDT.  
The second contribution of this article is to argue for an alternative form of 
what it terms labour-centred development (LCD). This argument is 
supported through an examination of the Chilean cordones industriales and 
Argentinian empresas recuperadas por sus trabajadores (ERT) 
movements. The article concludes that whilst LCD may be a rarity, its 
existence offers the basis for alternative development theory and strategy.  
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1 – INTRODUCTION 
It is increasingly common to read critiques, or even obituaries, of the ‘pink tide’ 
in Latin America from the political left (Webber: 2014, Wallerstein: 2015, Saad-
Filho: 2015). These critiques highlight how despite having made some 
improvements though social policy to the welfare of the poor in the societies over 
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which they govern(ed), left-wing Latin American governments have supported 
and encouraged the reproduction of hierarchical and exploitative social relations. 
These policies - including containment of wage demands, limits on popular 
participation in resource allocation, resource extractivism based on an openness 
to foreign direct investment (across economic sectors), and more generally the 
promotion of indigenous capitalist class formation – reproduce the power of 
capital over labour. Where they still exist, the progressive shine is rapidly coming 
off the pink tide regimes. It is necessary, therefore, to reconsider what alternative 
forms of development look like.  
 This article contributes to debates about the possibility of pursuing 
progressive development strategies in Latin America and beyond in two ways. 
First, it provides a theoretical critique of what it labels Elite Development Theory 
(EDT). Such a critique shows how, despite many different conceptions of state-
society relations, EDT’s share an axiomatic common ground which legitimates 
labour exploitation and oppression. The strands of EDT examined in this article 
are the Washington Consensus and Statist Political Economy. While these 
perspectives have significant differences, it is argued here that they share a 
common axiomatic foundation – that states and capital are prime-movers in, and 
that labour control is a constitutive feature of, the development process. The 
neodevelopmentalist strategies pursued across much of Latin America rest upon 
the same axioms that are foundational to EDT.  
Whilst there has been broad praise for Latin America’s Pink Tide (Riesco 
2007; Wylde 2012), the strategies pursued by these regimes have been critiqued 
for relying on the deepening exploitation and oppression of worker resistance 
characteristic of EDT (Leiva 2008; Mariña-Flores 2015). This is increasingly 
apparent in some leading examples from across the continent. In Brazil, labour 
and other marginalised social actors have been incorporated into the 
developmental project of the state, seeing minimal social benefits but the 
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continuation of the existing social and political order (Saad-Filho 2015; Chodor 
2015). The order that preceded Lula remains firmly intact. Hence Alfrado Saad-
Filho notes how “[t]here has been no meaningful attempt to reform the 
Constitution or the political system, challenge the ideological hegemony of 
neoliberalism, neutralize the mainstream media, or transform the country's 
economic structure or international integration” (Saad-Filho 2015). 
In Ecuador there is a similar picture. Despite offering vague promises of 
“living well”, the Correa government has focused on consolidating existing 
economic privilege and power. Jeff Webber argues that “Correa calmed the storm 
and restored profits in sectors like banking, mining, oil, and agro-industry, and 
has simultaneously coopted or crushed most independent social movement 
activity” (Webber 2015). 
In both of these instances, state-led neodevelopmentalism has provided the 
labouring classes with some social and economic benefits and some political 
inclusion. But this has come at a cost of embedding the prevailing mode of 
development premised on their continuing exploitation. 1  Such contradictions 
have now begun to crystallise as the region faces up to the “end of the cycle” of 
progressive government (Mondonesi 2015; Katz 2016). The resurgence of the 
Right under Macri in Argentina and the coalition of parties that recently dented 
PSUV hegemony in Venezuela represent the failure of these governments to meet 
the popular demands that brought them to power.  
                                                          
1 The case of Brazil is archetypical of what Castañeda (2006) has referred to as the “good left” in Latin America, 
adopting pragmatic, reformist strategies that do little to confront the prevailing socio-economic order. Ecuador 
under Rafael Correa, alternatively, is seen to constitute part of the “bad left” driven by populist-inspired 
confrontation with domestic and international elites. Yet recent research has shown such crude dichotomies to 
be severely limiting, with the Pink Tide characterised by differing models of governance and economic and 
social policies with complex historical origins and relations to earlier neoliberal reforms (Grugel & Riggirozzi 
2009; MacDonald & Ruckert 2009a; Silva 2009). Recognising the significance of the diversity across the 
region, our argument echoes that of MacDonald and Ruckert (2009b: 10) inasmuch as we understand top-down 
neodevelopmentalism as premised on a “deep conditioning and social engineering” of individuals to market 
relations. Even the most radical cases, namely Bolivia and, to a lesser extent, Venezuela, remain subject to such 
processes (Webber 2009; Domingo 2009; Meltzer 2009).  
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This article argues that developmental processes, whether top-down or 
bottom-up, are generated primarily through the transformation of class relations. 
The ability of capital and states to mobilise, discipline and employ labour is the 
foundation upon which capitalist development, whether state or market-led, is 
based. The core concerns of EDT – of state capacity, resource 
mobilisation/generation and structural transformation, and the entrepreneurial 
drive to innovate and accumulate capital – are based, fundamentally, upon labour 
control. Without the latter, the former cannot occur.  
The second contribution of this article is to identify non-elite forms of human 
development in Latin America, past and present. To this end it examines the 
Chilean cordones industriales and the Argentinian empresas recuperadas por sus 
trabajadores. 2  Both of these cases demonstrate the latent and continuing 
potential for labour to counter elite development strategies and to build political-
economic alternatives centred on new priorities. The cordones industriales, 
which emerged in the early 1970s under the socialist government of Salvador 
Allende show how workers mobilising in response to a proclaimed socialist 
transition generated new opportunities for development. Occupying their 
factories, they began to confront the limits imposed by former owners that had 
begun to drive their firms toward bankruptcy. In conjunction with the state, they 
brought new life to stagnant sectors like textile production and began 
independently to transform the management and social organisation of production 
in the workplace itself.  
Our second case study is of the empresas recuperadas por sus trabajadores 
(ERT) in 21st century post-crisis Argentina.  With the state vacillating between 
                                                          
2 Our inclusion of the Chilean case, despite the plethora of highly significant examples across the region from 
the “socialist production units” in Venezuela (Larrabure et al 2011; Lebowitz 2015) to the landless workers’ 
movements in Brazil or the Zapatistas in Mexico, is to demonstrate the continuity of LCD. In this view, LCD is 
not linked to any specific moment of rupture or crisis, but is a contested and unfolding potential borne of 
struggles by workers in a variety of socio-political and historical contexts.  
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limited support and open political repression, workers in these plants have 
revitalised firms that, in many cases, were deliberately being driven toward 
bankruptcy by their former owners. Occupying workers have transformed the 
day-to-day organisation and management of these factories and mobilised 
grassroots networks to consolidate progressive developmental outcomes 
achieved in the factory and community.    
We demonstrate how these movements can exceed many of the indicators of 
elite forms of development (for example productivity and efficiency). More 
importantly, however, we argue that such forms of development represent a 
fundamental challenge to elite development theory and practice, including the 
neodevelopmentalist strategies pursued across Latin America. We argue, further, 
that they point the way towards new forms and conceptions of human 
development, conceptualised here as Labour-Centred Development (LCD).  
In both cases labouring class collective actions were initially defensive - in 
response to the truck-driver’s strike in Chile and in response to the threat of mass 
unemployment in Argentina. However, their subsequent evolution into more 
offensive organisations (in particular in Chile) demonstrates an important element 
of Labour-Centred Development (LCD). As labouring class collective actions 
deepen and expand they make what Michael Lebowitz (2010) calls ‘inroads’ and 
‘encroachments’ into capital’s power over labour. Such inroads might entail, for 
example, labouring classes taking over capital’s decision-making functions such 
as resource allocation and investment, as well initiating transformations in the 
social organisation of the workplace. We consider such moves early phases of 
LCD. We also consider them to be relatively transitory. Depending on the balance 
of class forces they will either be rolled back by established capitalist forces, or 
advance as labouring classes are able to place under democratic control greater 
parts of the economy and polity. Nevertheless, they represent genuine processes 
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of socio-economic transformation which have contributed significantly to the 
human development of their protagonists and their communities.  
 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Part 2 argues how even 
though EDT relegates class relations to (at best) secondary importance compared 
to strategies of state and capital, it still recognises these relations. We argue, 
contrary to EDT, that these relations should be the primary objects for 
development analysis. Part 3 interrogates and theorises the nature of the capital-
labour relation and, on this basis, argues that it provides the basis for our 
conception of Labour-Centred Development (LCD). Part 4 provides two 
historical-empirical case studies of LCD - the Chilean cordones industriales and 
the Argentinian empresas recuperadas por sus trabajadores (ERT) movement. 
Part 5 concludes by discussing the prospects for LCD as a realistic rival to EDT.  
 
2 – CLASS RELATIONS IN ELITE DEVELOPMENT THEORY 
This section provides a brief discussion of the Washington consensus and Statist 
Political Economy, as representatives of Elite Development Theory. In many 
ways neodevelopmentalism in Latin America represents a particular amalgam of 
these two traditions, with the addition of limited progressive social policy (Saad-
Filho: 2015, Webber: 2015). Whilst labour control and exploitation are 
recognised by EDT, the class struggles waged from above by states and capital 
necessary to achieve it, are neither theorised nor recognised as constitutive of the 
development process. Rather, they are subsumed within EDT’s primary foci, in 
particular state capacity and innovative entrepreneurial drive. This subsumption 
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obscures the importance to EDT of class relations in general and labour control 
in particular.3  
 
2.1 Washington-Consensus Style Neoliberalism 
The Washington Consensus (WC) conception of development derives from 
Adam Smith’s understanding of gains from specialization, David Ricardo’s 
theory of comparative advantage, and marginalist economics’ emphasis upon 
‘perfect’ markets. For the purposes of this article, it is the last in this triptych that 
reveals most clearly the labour repressive core of this variant of EDT. The 
marginalist conception of (perfect) markets holds that rigidities or inflexibilities 
reduce welfare gains from market participation.  
  The concept of market inflexibitily is utilized by WC proponents to 
theorise and justify (deleterious) reforms to workers’ conditions. Eliminating 
labour market inflexibilities is held to generate virtuous circles of rising firm 
profits, greater employment, and higher economic growth. Labour market 
inflexibilities were defined by Robert Solow as follows:  
[A] labour market is inflexible if the level of unemployment-insurance 
benefits is too high or their duration is too long, or if there are too many 
restrictions on the freedom of employers to fire and to hire, or if the 
permissible hours of work are too tightly regulated, or if excessively 
generous compensation for overtime work is mandated, or if trade unions 
have too much power to protect incumbent workers against competition 
                                                          
3 For reasons of space we do not discuss a range of Marxist traditions that exist within the orbit of EDT. But see 
Selwyn (2016).  
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and to control the flow of work at the site of production, or perhaps if 
statutory health and safety regulations are too stringent (Solow: 1988, 1).  
Restoring labour market flexibility is portrayed as being in workers long-run 
interests.  For example, Anne Kreuger argues that ‘with a sufficiently low urban 
wage, a zero unemployment level is a feasible outcome…’ (Kreuger: 1983, 20).  
  
Connell and Dados (2014) argue that neoliberal economic policies originated in 
Latin America and were only later formalised as the Washington Consensus. 
Indeed, Pinochet’s 1973 coup in Chile signifies the first significant attempt to 
genuinely establish a liberal economy with minimal labour market distortions. 
The intense violence, both direct (the tortures and murders during and after the 
coup) and indirect (through the labour market and the generation of mass 
unemployment and very low wage jobs) were welcomed by neoliberal supporters. 
Friedrich Hayek wrote how “I have not been able to find a single person even in 
much-maligned Chile who did not agree that personal freedom was much greater 
under Pinochet than it had been under Allende” (1978).  
 Connell and Dados (2014) argue that neoliberal type policies play 
an important role for peripheral countries’ elites. They rationalise these countries’ 
insertion into the world economy based on their comparative advantage. 
Consequently, such policies do not need to be forced upon these elites by northern 
powers, but in many ways reflect the former’s interests. Such elites, often 
organised around the agro-export sector, are resistant to state-led attempts to shift 
resources into industry. This is so, particularly, because such attempts often 
involve alterations in class relations.  
The Washington-Consensus has been intellectually opposed by Statist 
Political Economy. However, despite important policy differences between 
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neoliberal and statist political economists these two traditions share much 
common ground, in particular their refusal to consider how labouring classes can 
forge their own development strategies.   
2.2 Statist Political Economy 
Statist Political Economy (SPE) is rooted in the work of Alexander Hamilton 
(1791) and Friedrich List (1856). In Europe and North America following World 
War 2 arguments for state-economic direction were formulated by thinkers such 
as Gerschenkron, Kaldor, and Hirschman (see Selwyn: 2009). In Latin America 
it was articulated by the structuralist school, which emerged in crisis years 
following the 1929 crash. The Prebisch-Singer thesis represented a powerful 
rejection of the rationale of global integration based on comparative advantage 
precepts (Kay: 1989). Contemporary advocates of SPE, drawing on Chalmers 
Johnson’s (1982) concept of the Developmental State include Robert Wade, Ha-
Joon Chang, Alice Amsden, and Atul Kohli, and Peter Evans (see Selwyn: 2014). 
In Latin America, this has been complemented by the re-emergence of 
(neo)structuralist thinking, a major innovation supportive of neodevelopmentalist 
strategies around the pink tide (Leiva 2008). 
SPE represents a partial critique of liberal economics. It shows how 
contemporary developed countries did not industrialise according to comparative 
advantage maxims, but pursued ‘infant-industry’ strategies – including protective 
tariffs, subsidies and provision of R&D to nascent industries, and facilitation of 
reverse engineering.  
Whilst many states attempted to facilitate rapid industrialization through 
the above mentioned strategies in the decades following decolonization, not all 
succeeded. SPE explains these divergent outcomes by emphasizing state capacity 
to establish and orientate elite planning bodies. Evans’ (1995) concept of 
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‘embedded autonomy’, drawing on Weber’s (1978) concerns with bureaucratic-
rationality, represents an attempt to theorise dynamic relations between 
developmental state bureaucracies and business elites that generate long-term 
growth and industrial transformation.  
The above mentioned insights into the development process are important 
correctives to the WC insistence that ‘free markets’ are the best way to facilitate 
rapid economic development. SPE’s ability to effectively disprove a central 
argument of the WC explains its popularity as an alternative development strategy 
to neoliberalism. But SPE’s ‘progressive’ status is founded upon shaky ground. 
It is just as much committed to labour control and exploitation as is WC 
neoliberalism.  
For example, in her study of South Korean industrialisation, Alice Amsden 
(1990, 13–4, 18) recognises how ‘[h]igh profits in [its] mass-production 
industries have been derived not merely from investments in machinery and 
modern work methods… but also from the world's longest working week.’ And 
alongside effective investments, ‘cheap labour’ and ‘labour repression is the basis 
of late industrialization everywhere’. 
In his comparative study of late development in South Korea, India, Brazil 
and Nigeria, Atul Kohli (2004) illustrates the ability of the former state to allocate 
resources efficiently and to successfully implement long term industrial 
upgrading strategies. He notes, like Amsden, the need for strict workplace 
discipline. He also compares South Korea to the interwar European Fascist states. 
He concludes that:  
Generally right-wing authoritarian…[these states]… prioritize rapid 
industrialization as a national goal, are staffed competently, work closely 
with industrialists, systematically discipline and repress labour, penetrate 
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and control the rural society, and use economic nationalism as a tool of 
political mobilisation (Kohli 2004, 381). 
In Latin America the record of statist economic orientation is more varied. On the 
one hand Vargas’s fascist-inspired Estado Novo (1937-1945) and the 
Bureaucratic Authoritarian dictatorships of Brazil and Argentina in the 1960s and 
1970s (O’Donnell: 1979) are comparable to the East Asian developmental states. 
On the other hand, Cárdenas’ Mexico in the 1930’s represented a case of state-
assisted industrialisation with a significant degree of popular incorporation 
through land reform, implementation of minimum wages, trade union recognition 
and the establishment of corporatist-relations between state agencies, business 
sections and worker’s organisations (Haggard: 1990). Whilst varied the more 
progressive examples of statist political economy in Latin America have 
nevertheless been based upon the containment and restriction of labouring class 
collective actions. 
Whilst SPE represents a powerful critique of WC neoliberalism it rests, 
ultimately, upon the same axiomatic foundations as the WC. It intellectually 
denies labouring classes the agency to forge their own developmental strategies, 
and advocates and justifies the latter’s political repression and economic 
exploitation for the ‘higher goal’ of national development.  
EDT’s subsumption of the labour question to its higher priorities of 
(combinations of) innovative entrepreneurial strategy and state resource 
generation and allocation relegates the capital-labour relation to secondary 
importance within the analysis of development. Labour control tends to be 
conceived of as a technical issue, to be resolved by state agencies and firm 
managers. Interestingly, Max Weber expressed well the concerns common to 
EDT in his conception of economic rationality. The latter requires the firm 
subordination of labour to capitalist managers: 
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It is generally possible to achieve a higher level of economic rationality if 
management has extensive control over the selection and the modes of use 
of workers, as compared with the situation created by the appropriation of 
jobs or the existence of rights to participation in management. The latter 
conditions produce technically irrational obstacles as well as economic 
irrationalities. In particular, considerations appropriate to… the interests of 
workers in the maintenance of jobs… are often in conflict with the 
rationality of the organisation (Weber: 1978: 137-8).  
 
Hence, while Weber advocates ‘extensive control’ by management over labour, 
he recognises that the latter has its own concerns, which might come into conflict 
with the former. This observation is important, because as we shall argue below, 
it opens the way towards an alternative conception of resource allocation, social 
wealth and social relations, and ultimately of human development.  
 
3 - THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LABOUR AND THE THEORY OF 
LABOUR-CENTRED DEVELOPMENT 
Elite Development Theory understands the process of development from the 
perspective of capital. It views capital’s needs (of accumulation and enhanced 
competitiveness) as the basis for achieving human development.  It also views 
labour from the perspective of capital – where labour’s needs (for better 
conditions and higher wages) are achieved on the basis of securing, firstly, 
capital’s needs. The roots of EDT’s elitism, therefore, is to view the world 
through the lens of capital.  
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This section, in contrast to EDT, introduces the twin theories of the 
political economy of labour and Labour-Centred Development.4  
In his inaugural address to the first International Marx provided two 
examples of the political economy of labour. The first example, the Ten-Hours 
Act (introduced in England in 1847 which legally reduced the working day to a 
maximum of ten hours), was the first time that “in broad daylight the political 
economy of the [capitalist] class succumbed to the political economy of the 
working class” (Marx: 1864).  The second example was the creation of worker-
run cooperative factories. The latter were of great significance because ‘[b]y deed 
instead of by argument... [such organisations]… have shown that production on 
a large scale, and in accord with the behests of modern science, may be carried 
on without the existence of a class of masters employing a class of hands’ (ibid).  
The theory of Labour-Centred Development derives from the political 
economy of labour, and has a fundamentally different conception of social wealth 
and how to utilise it than EDT.  
EDT views the relationship between labour and capital as follows: 
K – WL – K', 
where K = capital and WL = wage labour. In this schema capital reproduces and 
expands itself (accumulates and heightens is competitiveness) through its 
employment of wage labour in order to generate exchange values (goods to sell 
on the market), and surplus value (K'), through an institutionalised capture of 
workers’ unpaid labour.  
From this vantage point, any disruption to capital’s employment of wage 
labour harms capital’s objectives of accumulation and labour’s objectives of 
                                                          
4 As will become apparent, this section draws upon the work of Michael Lebowitz (1992).  
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higher wages and better working conditions (such as shorter hours). A range of 
strategies designed by capital to discipline labour are therefore theoretically and 
practically justified. As will be argued below, these strategies are not only used 
to secure the production of exchange values and surplus value. They are also used 
in order to preclude the emergence of the political economy of labour.  
A Labour-Centred Development (LCD) perspective starts from the 
opposite side of the capital-wage labour relation. It views the relationship 
between wage labour and capital as follows: 
 
WL – K – WL.  
Here labour must sell itself to capital in order to earn the wages required to 
reproduce itself. Put differently, capital mediates the reproduction of labouring 
class needs. However, in this context of mediation, the objectives of labour are 
not simply subsumed under those of capital, but are sought by workers sometimes 
within the wage-labour relation and sometimes against it. Importantly, as will be 
discussed, the objectives of labour generate an alternative vision of social needs 
and social wealth, which can give rise to an alternative political economy of 
development. These two sets of needs (of capital and of wage-labour) mostly co-
exist within an institutionally defined context where the needs of the former 
determine those of the latter. But the fact of the existence of the latter means that 
there is always the possibility that it will, through collective action, begin to be 
formulated in ways that reject the primacy of capital and its mediating role.  
From this perspective the core concerns for LCD analysis are not those of 
capital (how to secure accumulation), but those of labouring classes. These 
include workers’ ability to reproduce their wage labour outside work (i.e. to earn 
enough wages and have enough time to secure the basic necessities of life and to 
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engage in culturally-enhancing activities such as socialising and education), 
extending to more free time (shorter working days) andmore decision-making 
ability within the workplace (to reduce the burden of work) (see below).  
Because EDT views labouring class needs as deriving from securing the 
needs of capital, it fails to comprehend or attempts to obscure, the potential 
existence of a rival political economy to its own.  Furthermore, EDT’s capital-
centric vantage point means that it reduces labour power, and consequently a 
large segment and sometimes the majority of society, to an input into the 
production process.  
LCD’s vantage point – its recognition of the potential existence of two rival 
political economies of human development – enables it to comprehend labour 
power as something fundamentally different to that envisioned by EDT.  
As Michael Lebowitz (2003, 127) describes: 
The value of labour-power looks different from the two sides of 
capital/wage-labour relation. Just as for capital it is the cost of an input for 
the capitalist process of production, for workers it is the cost of inputs for 
their own process of production.  
Consequently: 
Two different moments of production, two different goals, two different 
perspectives on the value of labour-power; while for capital, the value of 
labour-power is a means of satisfying its goal of surplus value…for the 
wage-labourer, it is the mans of satisfying the goal of self-development 
(Lebowitz: 2003, 127).  
Whilst EDT claims to point to a future characterised by a high and rising level of 
human development, the way it views the capital – wage-labour relation (K – WL 
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– K') illustrates how, for labouring classes, that future will be one eternally 
circumscribed by the needs of capital. If in that future capital is unable to realise 
its objectives of accumulation and enhanced competitiveness, labouring class 
needs are expendable.  
LCD’s view of the capital – wage-labour relation (WL – K – WL) suggests 
both a variety of ways in which labouring classes can reproduce themselves vis-
a-vis capital (including various forms of control/regulation of capital), and opens 
the way to enquiring how, and under what circumstances capital can be removed 
from its mediating role, or put differently, how labouring classes can reproduce 
themselves and fulfil (identify, meet, expand) their needs without capital.  
 
One or Two Political Economies? 
The LCD perspective advanced here argues that the political economy of labour 
represents a potential rival to the political economy of capital. Its rivalry is 
expressed, most clearly, through a) its different conception of social wealth and 
how to use it, and b) through its struggle with capital to make a) part of societal 
common sense (to a greater or lesser extent). A form of this struggle that is 
constitutive to the capitalist development process is that pursued by capital to 
deny the existence of a rival political economy to itself. As Lebowitz notes, 
‘[C]apital does not merely seek the realisation of its own goal, valorisation; it also 
must seek to suspend the realisation of the goals of wage-labour’ (Lebowitz: 1992, 
85). Lebowitz and Marx are clear of the ruinous effects upon labouring classes if 
they are to internalise the political economy of capital. According to Marx, in an 
ideal world for capital: 
What the lot of the labouring population would be if everything were left 
to isolated, individual bargaining, may be easily foreseen. The iron rule of 
17 
 
supply and demand, if left unchecked, would speedily reduce the producers 
of all wealth to a starvation diet (Marx:1867)  
However, workers’ organisations contradict these rules and potentially represent 
an alternative political economy. Collective gains against capital are won through 
‘negating competition, [and] infringing on the ‘sacred’ law of supply and demand 
and engaging in ‘planned co-operation’’. (Lebowitz: 1992, 67, citing Marx).  
 The political economy of labour is generated by labouring class collective 
actions. In turn it gives rise to novel developmental dynamics that are invisible 
and antithetical to EDT.  
 
States and the Capital-Labour Relation 
States play a central role in constructing and managing the political and 
legal structures within which capital accumulation occurs. These structures 
constrain workers’ ability to organise, by determining which actions are legally 
recognised. States work to naturalise and implement across society the political 
economy of capital. Bob Jessop’s (2001, 2008) conception of the state as a 
strategic relational actor illuminates how states engage in building institutions 
designed to structure the behaviour of their citizens and social classes, to 
simultaneously reproduce state power and to guarantee the process of capital 
accumulation. ‘Institutionalisation involves not only the conduct of agents and 
their conditions of action, but also the very constitution of agents, identities, 
interests and strategies (Jessop: 2008, 1230 emphasis added).   
However, states also respond to labour’s collective actions in ways that 
individual firms do not. Hence, the production and reproduction of state 
institutions, ‘is incomplete, provisional, and unstable, and… coevolve[s] with a 
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range of other complex emergent phenomena’ (Jessop: 2001: 1228, 1230). State 
institutions, ranging from those established to manage the capital-labour 
relationship (ministries of labour) to their welfare functions, to their democratic 
forms, can themselves be understood as outcomes of prior and on-going struggles 
between capital and labour. The implications of this conception of the state is 
firstly, that through collective actions labouring classes can extract human 
developmental gains from states and capital. As we shall illustrate in the 
following section, because capitalist states are partially flexible, there are at 
particular historical conjunctures opportunities for 1) the absorption and 
institutionalisation by the state of aspects of the political economy of labour 
within the social structure of accumulation and 2) the partial emergence and co-
existence and of the political economy of labour with the political economy of 
capital.  
The strategic-relational conception of the state also potentially illuminates 
the tensions and limitations arising from capitalist states’ incorporation and 
institutionalisation of labouring class demands and movements. That the political 
economy of labour potentially represents an opposing conception of social wealth 
to that of the political economy of capital – what it is, to what ends it should be 
used, how it should be allocated – means that the former’s incorporation and 
institutionalisation within the state will be subordinate to the latter’s. Furthermore, 
it is likely that representatives of the latter will attempt to strictly delimit and 
potentially reduce labouring class influence within the state. As we shall in both 
cases below, incorporation into the state often leads to the disarticulation of 
and/or deepening conflict with workers’ movement as a consequence of these 
limitations.   
 
4 - LABOUR-CENTRED DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 
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In this section we will examine two cases of labour-centred development: the 
cordones industriales in Chile and the empresas recuperadas por sus 
trabajadores (ERT) in Argentina. We show that the developmental outcomes of 
both cases derive from the historical contexts in which they were established, the 
origins of their emergence, and the organisational forms established by workers.  
Significantly, whilst the Chilean factory occupations occurred in the context of 
widespread revolutionary tumult, with the electoral victory of Salvador Allende 
in 1970 and mass mobilisations throughout the economy continuing throughout 
the three years of his government, those in Argentina are a marginal, albeit 
growing, phenomenon. As we show in our case study, current employment levels 
remain below 10 000 workers which, although significant, highlights the 
immense challenges faced across the disparate sectors to which these workers 
contribute.  
From here, we explore the developmental outcomes and their implications for 
understanding a development led by and for workers. Findings are drawn from 
primary and secondary empirical data and focus on four core aspects: 
(1) Growth and productivity 
(2) Employment data 
(3) Workplace organisation  
(4) Production priorities 
Moreover, whilst many of the changes were (and continue to be) dramatic 
and the lessons that can be drawn from them potentially transformative, we 
acknowledge their limitations. In this sense, we show that the struggle that we 
place at the heart of the development process is, as argued by Michael Lebowitz 
(2003: 204), less the result of labour placing barriers to the political economy of 
capital, but rather capital continually mobilising to impose barriers to the political 
economy of labour, and by and large, succeeding in its attempts to do so. 
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4.1 - Chile and the cordones industriales: a revolution in development 
Nearly consigned to the post-Cold War dustbin of history, the cordones 
industriales have begun to excite the interest of scholars across disciplines 
(Gaudichaud 2004; Castillo 2009; Fishwick 2015a). The surge of workplace 
occupations that accompanied the electoral success of Salvador Allende and 
Popular Unity (UP) marked the emergence of the cordones industriales. Literally 
translated as “industrial belts”, they comprised a range of small, medium, and 
large factories throughout Santiago. Workers occupied them initially in defensive 
mobilisations against bankruptcy, employer sabotage, in response to unpaid 
wages, and, later, in offensive mobilisations to further a socialist political project 
(Angell 2010: 48; Gaudichaud 2005: 97; Castillo 2009: 158-159). These 
occupations accelerated throughout the three-year government of the UP and 
peaked after the Bosses’ Strike of October 1972 that saw employers’ associations 
and their political allies attempt to paralyse the economy (Valenzuela 1989 cited 
in Salazar & Pinto 2010b: 45). In response, workers in the cordones mobilised, 
establishing new networks of supply, introducing alternative production relations, 
and consolidating relations between occupied firms.  
Central to establishment of the cordones were links between worker-led 
firms and the state. Large firms – nationalised and incorporated into the Social 
Property Area (APS) – played a leading role. Those in the textile sector, for 
example, were central to some of the most active of these nascent organisations. 
Workers from these firms played a leading role in the organisation of the 
cordones, establishing networks of production and exchange, providing the 
spaces for mass meetings where the decisions were taken about occupation, 
mobilisation, and self-management, where armed defensive groups were 
organised to protect against right-wing militias and growing police and military 
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violence, and where much of the technical expertise that was disseminated 
originated.5  
Political activists, particular those from the Revolutionary Left Movement 
(MIR), also played an important role in this process (Luciano in Gaudichaud 2004: 
114; Cancino 1988: 217). But it was the increasingly contested practice of worker 
participation, including in the management of production, which was crucial. 
Participation schemes were introduced to firms in the APS (as will be discussed 
below), but in many of the smaller plants workers set the terms of their own 
participation. Significantly, relative neglect by the UP produced a new set of 
social practices labelled as a “new popular sociability” in these workplaces, as 
the need to act outside established “formal institutional pathways” subverted 
established forms of participation (Castillo 2009: 241-242; Moulian 2006: 268). 
As a result, formal demands in “First Textile Workers Meeting” on the 14th and 
15th July 1973 criticised the state-led schemes as “superstructural” (Castillo 2009: 
245-246). For workers in the cordones both in the small and large factories, the 
“road to socialism” being pursued by the UP simply did not meet the expectations 
created by their experiences in the spaces they now controlled. 
It was these new spaces and emergent practices that were central to new 
forms of development. The UP sought, through a policy of “reactivation”, to 
increase output through subsidy and credit to nationalised firms and through 
centralised control over production. These measures ranged from the worker 
participation schemes to early “cybernetic” programme for automated control 
over production (Medina 2011).  
Workers were mobilised through the Communist Party-inspired “battle for 
production” slogan, which called on those in the factory to boost output to support 
                                                          
5 See Winn 1986 for details of the relationship between Yarur and cordon O’Higgins and Castillo 2009 for 
details of the role of the relationship between Textil Progreso and cordon Vicuña Mackenna, Yarur and cordon 
O’Higgins, Sumar and cordon San Joaquín, and Said and Perlak and cordon Cerrillos-Maipú. 
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the UP (Fishwick 2015a). In the workplace this translated to a reorientation of the 
priorities of production. Rather than productivity increases based on the 
intensification of the working day, improvements were achieved through 
improved utilisation of machinery and increased employment.6  
Table 1: Output for Selected Textile Firms in APS, 1970-1971 (FENATEX 
09/71, 3: 4-5; Fishwick 2015b: 178) 
Firm Duration Changes in Output 
Paños Oveja 1970 to 1971 Fabric (metres): 110 000 to 140 000 
Bellavista 1970 to 1971 Fabric (metres): 90 000 to 196 800 
FIAP 1970 to 1971 Fabric (metres): 70 000 to 128 900 
Fabrilana 
February 1971 to 
June 1971 
Processed wool (kilos): 38 120 to 81 
019 
Sumar Seda 
February 1971 to 
July 1971 
Patterned wool (metres): 227 564 to 
435 420 
Sumar 
Algodón 
May 1971 to July 
1971 
Spun cotton (kilos): 330 296 to 357 
725 
Cotton fabric (metres): 1 518 053 to 1 
823 596 
Algodones 
Hirmas 
June 1970 to June 
1971 
Yarn (kilos): 386 043 to 473 310 
Finished fabric (metres): 1 665 559 to 
1 711 786 
 
Output increased notably (see Table 1). Of those large textile firms in the 
cordones, Ex-Sumar Planta Poliester saw an increase in output of between 15 per 
cent and 20 per cent and Textil Progreso raised output by 19 per cent within the 
first year of its incorporation into the APS. In addition to increased output, the 
needs of workers were addressed in new ways. Within these factories, they 
constructed a paediatric clinic, a nursery for forty children, provided transport for 
                                                          
6 Economic data is drawn from some remaining examples of trade union newspapers Central Única and 
FENATEX held in the National Library in Santiago, Chile. However, one legacy of the Pinochet dictatorship 
was to ensure trade union and opposition party archives, radical newspapers, and personal documents were 
largely destroyed (Erickson et al 1974: 121). Consequently, findings are necessarily fragmentary and 
incomplete. 
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workers, and improved medical services (FENATEX 07/71, 1: 2; Central Única 
6-7/1972, 9: 7). Increases in production volumes were orientated toward making 
a tangible difference to the lives of workers, their families, and their communities, 
rather than, as prior to workers’ control, to demands of accumulation and 
profitability. 
Dramatic changes also occurred in rates of employment across leading 
sectors. Prior to 1970, productivity increases relied on employment reduction and 
the introduction of modern techniques of workplace organisation (which will be 
discussed further below). At Yarur, for example, the largest textile firm in Chile, 
a failed general strike in 1962 allowed the firm to fire over 1000 workers, which 
was the amount recommended by American advisors Burlington Mills for its 
modernisation (Winn 1994: 30-31). In contrast, after 1970, the largest firms – as 
a result of increasing output levels achieved under workers’ control and of 
workers utilising new machinery in new ways – were extensively hiring new 
workers. For example, at Rayón Said, a leading producer of synthetic fibres, 
production increases of over 50 per cent allowed for the hiring of forty new 
workers (FENATEX 07/71, 1: 2). Reflecting these changes on a national scale, 
between 1970 and 1973, manufacturing employment throughout the economy 
rose by over 100 000 to roughly 664 000 (Stallings 1978: 256-257).  
Alongside such changes in production and employment, wages also grew 
significantly (table 2).  
Table 2: Real Industrial Wage Index, Chile, 1970-1973 (1955 = 100) 
(adapted from Pinchot 1991: 538; Fishwick 2015b: 72) 
Year 
Industrial Wage 
Index 
Consumer Price 
Index 
Real Industrial Wage 
Index 
1970 6 211 3 948 157 
1971 8 873 4 753 187 
1972 14 641 8 432 174 
1973 44 366 38 329 116 
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Despite the rapid inflation that occurred in 1973 that reduced the value of 
real wages, increases in nominal wage rates had an important effect on the lives 
and livelihoods of workers not just in the largest factories – where wages had 
always been higher – but throughout industry. Overall, as a result of these wage 
increases, workers’ relative share of GDP rose from 51 per cent in 1970 to 62.9 
per cent in 1972 (Salazar & Pinto 2010a: 47).   
New and increasing employment levels came with important 
transformations in the workplace. Workplace relations previously were typified 
by strong managerial discipline, relatively limited political representation, and 
poor working conditions (Angell 1969; Fishwick 2015b). In contrast, worker 
participation became a central feature of those firms in the APS and the cordones. 
For example, General Workers’ Assemblies were established that chose 
representatives to an Administrative Council and Production Unit Assemblies. At 
their peak, these schemes incorporated around 50 000 workers across the 
manufacturing sector (Frias et al 1987: 38; Silva 1999: 85-86). At Yarur, this 
“comanagement…stretched from the production committees on the factory floor 
elected by each work section to the enterprise’s Council of Administration”, with 
“the transformation of workers into managers…Ex-Yarur’s most significant 
achievement” (Winn 1986: 210-211).  
As previously highlighted, these practices of participation were intensified 
and transformed within the network of firms in the cordones. At the height of the 
Bosses Strike in 1972, for example, materials and expertise were lent between 
factories as production was continued without the presence of owners. In cordon 
Cerillos-Maipú, production, distribution, and supply were coordinated by 
workers, whilst workers at Ex-Sumar made trade and credit arrangements with 
neighbouring factories. Technical advisors gave assistance to smaller firms, 
whilst in workplace assemblies questions were openly raised on the division of 
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labour, factory hierarchy, and the legitimacy of private ownership (Hernán Ortega 
in Gaudichaud 2004: 202; Castillo 2009: 175 & 234-235; Gaudichaud 2005: 95).  
The new social organisation of production, premised on worker-led 
networks of small and large firms not only upended the strict hierarchy of 
previous management, but also led to innovation in the factories. At Ex-Yarur, 
for example, the maintenance division was transformed to produce three quarters 
of previously imported spare parts. Worker initiative also produced other changes, 
including new ventilation systems, production processes, and accounting systems 
(Winn 1986: 212-214). Moreover, there were signs of an important change from 
production for exchange value to production for use value, particularly addressing 
the needs of workers. As described by one metalworker in cordon Vicuña 
Mackenna: “the freedom of work is one of the essential successes. Now there is 
no police repression and we are producing for the people” (Javier Hernández in 
Mujica 2013: 22-23). As an example, in one fine furniture producer, workers 
began to manufacture cheap furniture for their own communities. This was 
understood as “real” participation in economic activity – the reorientation of 
production and development priorities to serve the interests of the workers 
themselves (Mario Olivares in Gaudichaud 2004: 167-168). As shown in Peter 
Winn’s in-depth ethnography of the Ex-Yarur plant, wholesale changes were 
underway in productive activity, social consciousness, and in a transformation 
towards “a uniquely Chilean economic democracy” (Winn 1986: 226). 
Complementing these “economic” developments were the integration of the 
cordones into the comandos comunales, community organisations that included 
mothers’ centres and neighbourhood councils (Vergara 2008: 162). Consequently, 
the cordones began to move via these engagements from survival responses to 
crisis to new, and potentially transformative, practices inside and outside the 
workplace.  
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Despite (or perhaps even because of) the relative success of the cordones 
industriales the barriers they faced were substantial. Internal and external 
challenges included a burgeoning black market, bureaucratic intransigence, and 
complaints such as those from workers at Ex-Sumar who decried the lack of 
engagement from the UP and difficulties in mass meetings, including a lack of 
“discipline” amongst some of their fellow workers in the factory (Silva 1999: 
267-268). Tensions with the ruling UP coalition – particularly with the 
Communist Party – were also pronounced. For the UP, those in the cordones 
represented an ultra-left, radical fringe (Juan Alarcón cited in Gaudichaud 2004: 
99). But for workers, the UP simply did not represent their new experiences of 
workplace control. Workers from the cordon Macul, for example, explicitly 
criticised the PC and the textile trade union FENATEX and, on 22nd June 1972, 
workers from across the cordones occupied the Communist-led Labour Ministry 
to oppose negotiations aimed at returning some of the leading occupied factories 
(Tomás Inostroza in Gaudichaud 2004: 222; Castillo 2009: 147-148).  
As the cordones became even more prominent after October 1972, and as 
a sign of increasing efforts to placate opponents and dismember their nascent 
organisation, the government ordered the abandonment of occupied factories and 
cleared protests and barricades with tanks and armed forces administrators sent 
to the unruliest factories (Silva 1999: 212 & 238-239). This violent response was 
a sign of the increasing opposition that was emerging to the cordones as an 
alternative political economic organisation. Yet repeated efforts by the UP to 
marginalise and undermine them failed. It was only the military that, using the 
cordones as examples of “Soviets” plotting an armed takeover of the country, 
destroyed them in and after the coup of 11th September 1973. 
 
4.2 - Argentina and the empresas recuperadas: reclaiming development 
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In the wake of the 2001 crisis in Argentina numerous new social movements 
emerged, with one notable example being the empresas recuperadas por sus 
trabajadores (ERT). There has been a significant amount of recent research on 
ERTs, focusing on labour process and production (Vieta 2010 & 2012), 
interaction with the labour movement and the state (Dinerstein 2007), and 
evolving political identities (Palomino et al 2010; Sitrin 2010; Vieta 2012). The 
following section synthesises empirical findings of this and other research 
alongside using detailed analyses produced by Ruggeri (2010, 2014).  
The ERTs comprise several hundred enterprises occupied by workers and 
converted into cooperatives. Recent research has identified 311 factories 
involving 13 462 workers. Of these, 144 were established between 2001 and 2004 
and 63 between 2010 and 2013 (Ruggeri 2014: 7; Palomino et al 2010: 253). 
Their composition is wide ranging, but mainly represented by SMEs in the 
industrial sectors of major cities. Of the 170 such firms in 2008, 50 per cent 
employed between 15 and 49 workers, 130 were industrial firms, and 104 were 
situated in and around Buenos Aires (Palomino et al 2010: 257-259). Despite 
their official status, the ERTs stand apart from the traditional cooperative 
movement. Some reject its “conservative” position, whilst others reject it on a 
more pragmatic basis, highlighting the inadequacy of existing cooperative laws 
(ibid: 270-271). 
As a general trend, the majority of ERTs were founded through struggle 
(Lavaca Collective 2004). This was apparent, for example, at the Brukman, but 
also in many other examples:  
We were going on fifteen days during which, although there was a ton 
of work, they didn’t pay us a cent. There was growing unrest that broke 
out on the fifth floor, in the pants section, where there was a smaller 
group than ours… Their anger was boiling over faster than ours, and 
they practically stopped production… Supposedly we took home a 
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hundred pesos every Friday, but that was already history at this point 
(Matilde Adorno, Brukman worker cited in Lavaca Collective 2004: 
67-69) 
Such a process is crucial in foregrounding what Maurizio Atzeni (2010) calls 
the “living encounter” of solidarity. As a result, the extent of conflict has a 
tangible impact on the organisation of the ERTs. For example, the length and 
veracity in the initial takeover of the firm has been shown to correlate directly 
with the likelihood of workers establishing equitable pay arrangements (Vieta 
2012: 144-145).  
In the course of these takeovers, moreover, political parties and traditional 
activists have played a limited role. In a few cases, such as at Brukman and Zanón, 
piqueteros and community assemblies supported workers, with local socialist 
parties involved after the initial occupations, and organisations, such as the 
National Movement of Reclaimed Factories (MNER), supporting their transition 
from private to collective ownership (Kabat 2011: 367; Lavaca Collective 2004: 
65-66; Rossi 2015: 99; Deledicque et al 2005: 61). Yet it was workers with little 
or no political experience who took the initiative (Vieta 2012: 131-132). They 
were mobilising in response to their own experience and to achieve their own 
aims. 
Consequently, ERTs have increasingly been consolidated by their members. 
Some are now legally protected entities utilising the legal framework centred 
upon the National Institute of Associative Activities and the Social Economy 
(INAES). To achieve such a status, at least six workers must sign the agreement 
and guarantee 10 per cent of the total minimum legal salary (approximately 
US$45 in 2004) to INAES. Workers also utilise the now-reformed Bankruptcy 
Law that permits them to establish the cooperative within an existing factory 
without taking on the existing debts (Rossi: 2015: 102). This process has led to 
approximately 12 per cent of occupied factories gaining the status of permanent 
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expropriation (Ozarow & Croucher 2014: 996). In 85 per cent of cases of 
expropriated factories national, provincial, or municipal subsidies have helped 
support ERTs and, furthermore, 82 per cent of occupied factories have received 
financial support from other ERTs (ibid: 996-997). The latter, in particular, helps 
to prevent an over-reliance of state subsidy, going some way to ensuring the ERTs 
remain relatively independent, worker-controlled spaces.  
Within these new spaces the practices of labour-centred development are 
clear. In a quote from a leading figure at Zánon, a ceramic tile factory that was 
one of the first to be occupied and converted to a cooperative, the relative success 
of the experience is apparent: 
In October 2001, the workers officially declared the factory to be 'under 
workers’ control'. By March 2002, the factory fully returned to 
production… During the period of workers’ control, the number of 
employees has increased from 300 to 470, and wages have risen by 100 
pesos a month, and the level of production has increased. Accidents 
have fallen by 90% (Elliot 2006) 
However, whilst larger, more successful firms such as Zánon have been able 
to increase output and productivity, in general production statistics have not been 
as positive. In 2002, most ERTs, for example, were producing at between 30 and 
60 per cent of capacity in comparison to peaks under private ownership (Ruggeri 
et al 2005: 65-76 cited in Vieta 2012: 137). Yet improvements have been notable 
in recent years. Between 2002 and 2010, there was an overall increase in the 
productivity and output levels across ERTs, with around 57 per cent of factories 
now producing above 60 per cent of capacity (Ruggeri 2010: 29).  
In terms of wages and employment ERTs have been an undeniable success 
compared to many workers’ former experiences of employment. For example, 56 
per cent maintain a policy of equal pay and more than half of those that do not 
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have a maximum pay gap of below 25 per cent (Ozarow & Croucher 2014: 999). 
Between 2004 and 2010, moreover, the number of workers in ERTs has increased 
from roughly 7000 to around 9400. Of this increase, 1762 are from newly 
established ERTs, meaning that around 700 were the result of rising employment 
levels (Ruggeri 2010: 39). Significantly, many new workers have been brought 
into the cooperative as full members. For example, in those ERTs established 
between 2010 and 2013, only 2 per cent of workers are hired on contracted terms 
and the majority of these are either aspiring to be members or hired solely for 
fixed terms (Ruggeri 2014: 34). As with decisions over pay parity, it is the extent 
of earlier struggles that have determined whether new workers become part of the 
cooperative or are hired as contracted employees (Kabat 2011: 376).   
The most significant innovations in these factories, highlighting their 
genuine transformational potential, are in the transformation of the social 
organisation of work. Decision-making has been democratised, with the majority 
of ERTs managed by workers’ councils through regular assemblies. Eighty-one 
percent of council and assembly members are appointed directly from the factory 
floor in those ERTs established after 2010, with fewer than twenty-seven percent 
having previously acted as union delegates (Ruggeri 2014: 39). Everyday issues 
are solved on the shop floor and new work processes approved and adopted 
amongst flexible work teams (Vieta 2012: 143; Kabat 2011: 377-380). New 
forms of accounting address the alienation felt by workers from the production 
process under private ownership, utilising new methods to transcend previous 
regulatory and institutional controls (Bryer 2012: 45-46). Overall, the 
“humanising” of the labour process and the transformation of the workplace has 
been notable. Flexible work, slower production processes, and the “incorporation 
of play and rest in the transformation of the rhythm of the working day” 
demonstrate an overcoming of the disciplining effect of work and the workplace 
(Vieta 2012: 142). This has been complemented by the elimination of the 
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distinction between manual and intellectual work, increasing delegation, and 
growing versatility as workers take on new tasks in the workplace (Kabat 2011: 
376). Job rotation is a particularly significant practice, shifting away from 
prevailing hierarchical and repetitive structures of work. This occurs in over two-
thirds of newly established ERTs, rising to seventy percent in those established 
prior to 2010 (Ruggeri 2014: 40). Workers, as such, are experiencing a new way 
of working, promoting the construction of an alternative development by being 
able to enjoy more control over their working lives, a more positive balance 
between work and leisure time, and learn a wider range of skills than under their 
former employers. 
The interaction of these worker-managed firms with the community is also 
notable. No longer serving the interest of private owners, many offer open 
community spaces, health clinics, education programmes, and, in the cases of 
Zánon and the Workers’ Solidarity Union (UST), a construction and parks 
maintenance firm, transfer revenue into community development projects (Vieta 
2012: 147-149). Combined with the shifting attitudes in the workplace, these 
activities point towards a transformation in economic and social relations. New 
experiences of solidarity in the workplace have engendered new cooperative 
social relations that give new meaning to work and the beginnings of more “social 
production” orientated towards producing what is understood as social wealth 
rather than profit-orientated capitalist surplus (Vieta 2012: 138; Vieta 2010: 311-
312). These intersect, moreover, with the horizontal social relations of the social 
movements and community organisations that emerged after 2001, contributing 
to the emergence of a new political subjectivity centred on production and 
occupation of the workplace (Sitrin 2010: 139-140).  
Nevertheless, there are limits for the ERTs. Workers’ control will always 
struggle to be translated into a non-capitalist form of labour-centred development 
as long as it exists within a capitalist sphere of circulation. In this instance, the 
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cooperative form of workplace organisation places significant constraints on 
workers in the ERTs. Marina Kabat (2011: 369-374) highlights how it has placed 
large financial burdens on newly established firms that, although somewhat 
overcome through the varied mechanisms described above, still stymie 
productive activity in many instances. She also points out that it has led, in many 
cases, to the return of capitalist relations in the factory, which include, most 
notably, the continued hiring of contracted employees and the sale of stock to 
external investors. 
To counter these constraints, Baldacchino (1990: 473) argues for the 
creation of “counter-institutional” support. This has, to an extent, begun to occur. 
So-called intracooperative and intercooperative learning processes have been at 
the heart of relations within and between the ERTs and the latter have been 
formalised in vertical integration agreements that include the sharing of materials 
to eliminate the pressures of competition (Vieta 2012: 139; Ozarow & Croucher 
2014: 997). Not only has this led to a change in the attitudes and activities of 
workers, but also to the relations between the occupied firms. Yet despite close 
local relations with other community and grassroots organisations, the wider 
“counter-institutional support” remains at an early and fragile stage. Moreover, 
whilst workers have gained enhanced freedom in work and, to a lesser extent, in 
exchange, they are still subjected to the laws of the capitalist market as 
transmitted via the sphere of circulation (Atzeni and Ghigliani: 2007: 668). The 
rigours of competition, securing customers and supplies, competing with existing 
producers in an environment hostile to these worker-led entities, and the 
constraints that derive from the cooperative form pose a serious threat to their 
continued existence. 
 
5 - CONCLUSIONS 
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In the early years of this millennium the left turn in Latin America raised hopes 
amongst many progressives of a challenge to seemingly dominant forms of 
neoliberal economic orthodoxy and the establishment of new paths of human 
development. Some of these new regimes had gained political office based in 
large part on sustained mass movements and struggles from below. It was 
assumed widely – by participants in those struggles and by many commentators 
– that the regimes would embody the spirits and desires of these movements to 
alter in fundamental ways, the strategies, practices and outcomes of development 
in the region.  
It has become increasingly apparent however, that the ‘left regimes’ have 
been more concerned with implementing forms of neodevelopmentalism than 
with establishing radically new forms of human development. Consequently, as 
increasing numbers of commentators have observed, these regimes have 
reproduced hierarchical, exploitative and oppressive regimes of capital 
accumulation and international integration, whilst providing some social benefits 
to the poorest of their societies.  
 This article contributes to the growing critiques of these regimes by 
illuminating how much development thinking, ranging across the political 
spectrum, is based upon axioms that prioritise elites as development actors and 
reduces the mass of the population to inputs into the development process. The 
article also provides an alternative conception, of development, rooted 
theoretically in Marx’s identification of the political economy of labour and 
demonstrated empirically in two case studies from Latin America’s rich history 
of labouring class collective action.  
 By illuminating the common axiomatic ground upon which much 
development theory stands, this article provides an explanation for the intrinsic 
limits to the progressive potential of neodevelopmentalism in Latin America. It 
suggests the need to burrow beneath the rhetoric of ‘progressive’ developmental 
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regimes in order to examine whether they are driven by movements which seek 
to transform continually labouring classes into developmental actors in their own 
right, or whether they seek to maintain existing hierarchical social relations whilst 
delivering some social reforms as a means to secure the (electoral) support of the 
masses. Elite Development Theory and practice takes many forms and it should 
not surprise us if new variants appear in the future.  
 The article also sought to provide an alternative conception of progressive 
social change, which it labels Labour Centred Development. Marx and 
Lebowitz’s identification of the political economy of labour as a rival political 
economic force to that of capital represents, we argue, a significant theoretical 
point of departure for conceiving of alternative strategies, practices and outcomes 
of human development. The political economy of labour, realised through 
workers’ collective actions, represents a prefigurative intellectual and political 
(material) force. Workers’ collective actions can generate real developmental 
gains within capitalism, and can raise questions, theories and strategies for both 
expanding such gains and linking them to the potential transcendence of capitalist 
social relations.  
In both cases presented here – the Chilean cordones industriales and the 
Argentinian empresas recuperadas por sus trabajadores (ERT) – labouring class 
collective actions generated new human development dynamics. In both cases 
these movements not only established collective forms of production and 
exchange, based upon principles and practices of democratic planning (i.e. 
democratic resource allocation), but they also demonstrated their ability to raise 
productivity and wages, and increase employment and reduce inequality within 
workplaces. They also demonstrated the capacity to interact and collaborate 
amongst themselves. Most importantly, we argue, they generated a new concept 
of human development, based upon democratic participation, in contrast to prior 
hierarchical forms of managerialism.  
35 
 
 To be sure, the cordones industriales and ERTs flourished under relatively 
left-leaning political regimes. But the very election of these regimes was itself a 
partial product of mass struggle from below. In many ways the cordones and 
ERTs can be seen as embodying the spirit of the movements that bought the 
Allende and Kirchner governments to office. Moreover, both movements found 
their attempts to consolidate their gains and continue their attempts to 
democratise sectors of the economy frustrated by the regimes, hence illustrating 
the intrinsic limits of progressive policies delivered from above by capitalist 
states. The cordones and the ERTs face(d) the continuing dilemma of how to 
reproduce more democratic working practices whilst participating within a 
broader capitalist economy.  
So, does Labour Centred Development realistically represent an alternative 
to varied forms of EDT and practice? After all, relatively well functioning 
examples of it are few and far between. Moreover, the limits faced by such 
attempts are significant. Surely, then, the best that can be hoped for are relatively 
progressive regimes that provide more rather than less social benefits for their 
populations?  
 If it were the true that examples of LCD were limited to ones like those 
discussed in this article, then perhaps such a conclusion would be warranted. But 
this is not so. The political economy of capital is not simply a theory (whether 
more statist or more market-based) of competitive accumulation. It is a practice 
that seeks to preclude the emergence of the political economy of labour.  
 The political economy of labour represents an alternative, labour-centred, 
vision of the social world. It can be considered as an ideological representation 
of labouring classes ‘for themselves’. It emerges from and further informs 
(successful) labouring class collective actions. LCD is a material product of 
successful workers’ struggles and movements.  
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The latent existence and sometimes emergence of the political economy of 
labour based upon labouring class collective actions means that LCD is 
potentially and partially generated in numerous cases and in myriad forms. Put 
differently, wherever there are newly forming or already established labouring 
classes attempting to ameliorate their conditions vis-à-vis capital and the state 
then there exist the possibilities of the emergence of the political economy of 
labour – the emergence of an alternative conception of how and to what ends 
social wealth should be produced, distributed, and consumed. Such collective 
actions and the visions of social change that they give rise to pave the way for a 
deepening of LCD.  
 Progressive thinkers, who place(d) so much hope in new forms of 
development being delivered from above, should consider whether it is better to 
look to collective actions from below as generative of more democratic, 
egalitarian, inclusive and cooperative forms of human development.  
 Many of the neodevelopmentalist regimes are now in crisis. As they turn 
towards more traditional (and authoritarian) forms of development, they will 
attempt, with ever greater intensity, to preclude the emergence of collective 
labouring class movements and their associated ideologies of progressive human 
change. The clash between elite led development, and attempts at LCD, which 
have often been occluded by relatively progressive social policy and the 
incorporation of subaltern movements into elite-led political movements, may 
become increasingly apparent. Under such circumstances the need for an 
alternative ideology, strategy, practice and conception of human development 
becomes ever more important.  
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